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The popularity of the deterrence perspective across multiple scientific disciplines has sparked a 
lively debate regarding its relevance in influencing both offenders and targets in cyberspace. 
Unfortunately, due to the invisible borders between academic disciplines, most of the published 
literature on deterrence in cyberspace is confined within unique scientific disciplines. This chapter 
therefore provides an interdisciplinary review of the issue of deterrence in cyberspace. It begins 
with a short overview of the deterrence perspective, presenting the ongoing debates concerning 
the relevance of deterrence pillars in influencing cyber criminals’ and cyber attackers’ operations 
in cyberspace. It then reviews the existing scientific evidence assessing various aspects of 
deterrence in the context of several disciplines: criminology, law, information systems, and 
political science. This chapter ends with a few policy implications and proposed directions for 










The considerable literature around the topic of cyber-deterrence continues to grow. Indeed, the 
popularity of deterrence-based policies in fighting offline crime (Nagin 2013), maintaining 
diplomatic relationships between countries (Quackenbush 2011), and combating the spread of 
diseases (Milne et al 2000) has cleared ground for the migration of deterrence-based approaches 
to cyberspace. In turn, this has sparked a lively debate regarding the relevance of this approach in 
influencing both cyber attackers’ (individuals and countries) malicious and non-malicious online 
behaviors (Taddeo 2018;Wilner 2019) and targets’ online self-protective behaviors (Maimon et 
al 2017).  
Unfortunately, due to the invisible yet rigid boundaries erected between academic 
disciplines, most of the published literature on deterrence in cyberspace is confined to specific 
areas and sub-populations which are of limited interest across scientific fields. For example, 
while criminologists are interested in understanding how sanction threats and punishment 
influence cybercriminals’ behaviors prior to, during the progression of (Maimon et al 2019), and 
in the culmination of an online criminal event, information systems scholars are more interested 
in understanding the effectiveness of deterrence-based policies in addressing employees’ 
computer misuse and increasing compliance with their employers’ cybersecurity policies 
(D’Arcy and Herath 2010). Similarly, while law scholars are interested in understanding the 
necessity of designated substantive cybercrime laws for deterring illegal online activities in the 
general public and among convicted offenders (Mayer 2015), political scientists tend to focus 
their debate on the relevance of deterrence-based principles in governing cyber conflicts between 
nations (Taddeo 2018).  
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Drawing on the notion that cybercrime research should be of an interdisciplinary nature, 
generate a comprehensive understanding of relevant concepts in the context of several related 
fields, and support concrete scientific contributions in each relevant field of study, this chapter 
intends to provide an interdisciplinary review of the literature around the issue of deterrence in 
cyberspace. It begins with a short overview of the theoretical premises laid out by deterrence 
theoreticians, then presents the ongoing debates concerning the relevance of the theory for 
influencing cyber criminals. The next sections review the existing documented scientific efforts 
aimed at assessing the validity of different dimensions of deterrence theory, in the disciplinary 
contexts of criminology, law, information systems, and political science. These efforts a focus on 
cyber-dependent crimes, i.e. illegal activities that can only be performed using a computer, 
computer networks, or other forms of information communication technology such as hacking 
and DDoS attacks (McGuire and Dowling 2013). Finally, the chapter’s conclusion proposes a 
few policy implications and recommends directions for future interdisciplinary academic 
research.  
Deterrence Theory: General Principles  
Deterrence theory has its roots in the writings of the 18th-century philosopher Cesare Beccaria 
(1963 [1764]), who proposed that humans are self-interested and rational decision-makers, 
driven in their actions by an economical “hedonistic calculus” whereby they seek to maximize 
pleasure and minimize pain. One key theoretical principle of the theory suggests that individuals 
are open to “deterrence” inasmuch as raising the costs of a behavior through sanctions would 
lower their willingness to pursue that course of action. Emphasizing the difference between 
specific and general deterrence, Beccaria explained that punishments for criminal behaviors aim 
at both preventing recidivism among convicted criminals (i.e. specific deterrence) and keeping 
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the general public from engaging in crime (i.e. general deterrence). Ultimately, the theory 
predicts that while forming expectations regarding the future outcomes of his or her behaviors, 
an individual’s fear of certain, swift, and severe punishment could translate to avoiding criminal 
behavior altogether (Beccaria 1963 [1764]).  
Explaining the delicate balance between severe yet still proportional punishments, 
Beccaria suggested that punishments should be proportional to the harm inflicted by the criminal 
act, and that more serious crimes should be followed by more serious punishments. Still, he 
stressed that it is the certainty of punishment and not its severity that leaves a lasting, deterring 
impression on the minds of individuals. Accordingly, the certainty of punishment carries a more 
substantial deterring effect than severe punishment, since the fear of more severe punishment 
will fail to translate to deterrence if it is accompanied by the hope that one may escape that 
punishment. As part of his recommendations to criminal justice systems, Beccaria advised 
authorities to publicize laws (in order to avoid the threat of tyranny), and to make these laws as 
clear and simple as possible in order to support deterrence efforts. Beccaria’s ideas and 
theoretical principles were conveyed in a classic essay (On Crimes and Punishment), which 
condemned the punitive approaches taken by the Italian criminal justice system during the 18th 
century when dealing with culprits. Beccaria’s essay, along with the work of Bentham (1789) in 
England, paved the way for a reformation of the early criminal justice systems in Europe and set 
the stage for the emergence of the criminological field of study. 
In parallel to the expansion of deterrence-based policies among global criminal justice 
agencies and their focus on preventing crime within individuals, the theoretical tenets of the 
deterrence perspective have also proved useful for guiding sovereign countries’ political courses 
when dealing with rival international players (Jervis 1979). Specifically, Schelling (1960) 
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suggested that a nation can commit itself to a deterrence strategy that is intended to prevent other 
nations from opportunistic aggression, by threatening some punishment against potential 
aggressors and promising rewards for a positive treatment. Explaining the deterring equation 
further, Snyder argued that “deterrence is a function of the total cost-gain expectations of the 
party to be deterred, and these may be affected by factors other than the apparent capability and 
intention of the deterrer to apply punishment or confer rewards” (1961: 9). Credible threats by a 
deterring party are key in this sense for instilling fear of consequences (Schelling 1966). 
Deterrence as a coercive national strategy has been discussed in the literature since World War 
II, yet it started to gain popularity during the 1950s and the Cold War era (Jervis 1979).  
Since discussions of cyber-deterrence are relevant both at the individual and group 
(mainly the state) levels, relevant academic research has been published in multiple academic 
disciplines, including criminology, law, information systems, and political science. Since their 
studies are imagined in the context of cyberspace, scholars from all of these fields reflect upon 
the relevance of deterrence and the applicability of the approach in preventing cyber-dependent 
crimes. On one hand, several scholars believe that the implementation of deterrence-based 
strategies (for example, sanctions and sanction threats) in cyberspace is prone to failure, since the 
inherently anonymous nature of this space complicates the task of attack attribution (Nye 2017) 
and increases online offenders’ ability to escape penalties for their illegitimate online behaviors 
(Harknett 1996; Harknett et al 2010; Denning and Baugh 2000). This theoretical claim is 
supported by the notion that potential offenders learn through trial and error that the certainty of 
being detected and punished for a criminal act is relatively low, so they initiate illegitimate 
behaviors. Since the certainty of detection and punishment for cyber-dependent crimes is even 
lower than the certainty of detection of a non-cyber criminal event, due to law enforcement’s 
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lack of preparedness to deal with cyber-dependent crimes (Dupont 2017), the enforcement of 
sanctions and sanction threats in a computing environment is predicted to play an insignificant 
role in preventing the occurrence of cyber-attacks (Lupovici 2011).  
In contrast, other scholars contend that despite the complexities involved, attribution can 
still be achieved in cyberspace (Rid and Buchanan 2015; Tor 2017). Still others suggest that it is 
unnecessary to identify specific individuals in order for deterrence to take effect in cyberspace 
(Goodman 2010). Accordingly, the introduction of situational deterrence cues in an attacked 
cyber environment could trigger a predictable avoidance response from an online offender and 
consequently attenuate the consequences of an online criminal event. For instance, since 
detection of a system trespassing event results in increased efforts by legitimate users to deny 
trespassers access to the attacked computer (Stoneburner et al 2002), implementing surveillance 
measures in a computing environment may lead system trespassers to overestimate the risk of 
detection on the system, devote increased efforts toward avoiding detection and hiding their 
presence, and even reduce harmful activity on the system. Therefore, even though deployment of 
deterrence-based measures in cyber environments will not necessarily prevent the occurrence of 
online crimes or result in official sanctions, it will increase offenders’ efforts to avoid detection 
and restrict the scope of their illegitimate activity during the progression of an online criminal 
event.  
To test the arguments raised by adherents of these two camps, scholars within these four 
academic disciplines have tested the validity of deterrence-based arguments in influencing online 
criminals and their targets. The next section reviews the specific theoretical adjustments scholars 
have made while using the deterrence perspective to guide academic research, as well as the 
empirical literature published within each relevant discipline.  
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Criminological Literature  
In his original discussion on the effectiveness of punishment in preventing offenders’ subsequent 
involvement in crime (i.e. recidivism), Beccaria proposed that certain severe and swift 
punishments would be more effective in deterring criminal behaviors (Beccaria, 1963 [1764]). 
All in all, findings from extensive criminological research indicate that assigning more severe 
punishment (i.e. longer prison sentences) carry a modest deterrent effect, and that increasing the 
certainty of detection and punishment (for example, by deploying more police presence in 
strategic locations) result in a consistent deterring effect (Nagin 2013). In addition to testing 
different aspects of classic deterrence in offline environments such as residential neighborhoods 
(Braga and Weisburd 2012) and schools (Maimon et al 2012), as well as elaborating the 
difference between general and specific deterrence (Pratt et al 2006), contemporary 
criminologists have elaborated on different aspects of deterrence, including the impact of 
punishment avoidance on an individual’s decision to initiate a criminal event (Stafford and Warr 
1993), the distinction between objective and subjective sanctions (Paternoster 1987), the 
communication platforms which could be used to convey a coherent deterring message (Geerken 
and Gove 1974), and the difference between informal and formal sanctions in deterring 
individuals’ involvement in crime (Anderson et al 1977). One additional theoretical elaboration 
in the context of deterrence was proposed by Gibbs (1975), who differentiated between absolute 
and restrictive types of deterrence. Gibbs (1975) conceptualized absolute deterrence as an 
individual’s total avoidance of criminal activity due to fear induced by some perceived risk of 
punishment. Restrictive deterrence, on the other hand, is defined as the (partial) curtailment of a 
certain type of criminal activity in order to reduce the risk of punishment.  
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Although deterrence-based research has dominated the criminological discipline within 
the last five decades, driving numerous investigations of the relationships between key 
theoretical constructs of deterrence and a wide range of offline crimes (Nagin 1998, 2013), 
empirical investigations of deterrence-based questions in cyberspace only started to emerge 
during the late 1990s. Skinner and Fream (1997) investigated the relationships between 
undergraduate students’ perceptions of punishment severity and certainty with their engagement 
in cybercrime (specifically digital piracy, guessing passwords, manipulating files with no 
permission, system trespassing, and writing malware). Their findings suggest that students’ 
perceptions of punishment severity were only a significant correlate to system trespassing.  
Similarly, Morris and Blackburn (2009) analyzed data collected from a different sample 
of undergraduate students. These scholars reported that a measure tapping students’ assessment 
of the chances of getting caught and their perceptions of severe punishment was significantly 
associated with password guessing, attempted hacking, and file manipulation. However, the 
theoretical framework that guided these two studies was that of social learning theory (Akers 
2017). Moreover, although these studies offer preliminary investigations of the relationship 
between an individual’s perception of punishment severity and certainty and his or her 
involvement in various online crimes, they still leave something to be desired due to the 
questionable operationalization of key deterrence constructs (especially in Morris and Blackburn 
2009) and their low alpha scores, the student-based sample they rely upon, and the cross 
sectional nature of the data.  
More recently, Holt and colleagues (2017) reported a significant association between 
students’ perception of law-enforcement’s likelihood to quickly recognize a cybercrime event 
and their willingness to engage in an ideologically motivated cyber-attack against a foreign 
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country. However, this research suffers from similar problems to those observed in Skinner and 
Fream (1997) and Morris and Blackburn (2009). In fact, Holt and associates’ reliance on 
students’ responses to vignettes for constructing their dependent variables is problematic in the 
context of deterrence, since the subjects’ lack of realistic understanding of the true costs (and 
benefits) of hacking casts a shadow on the validity of the constructs they create. Taking a 
somewhat different approach toward investigating the relationship between law enforcement 
reports of detection of online crime events and cybercrime, Guitton (2012) collected data on the 
number of attacks reported against businesses in France, Germany, and the UK between the 
years 2003 and 2010, then correlated the data with several proxies for law enforcements’ 
successful operations in cyberspace. Findings from his analyses suggest that the rate of 
newspaper articles reporting cybercrime incidents with a lack of attribution is positively related 
to the number of cyber-attacks reported against businesses in each of the observed countries. 
Given the serious methodological difficulties embedded in Guitton’s approach to data collection, 
any conclusion drawn regarding the effectiveness of attribution should be taken cautiously.  
Although early criminological research mainly employed survey designs and student-
based samples to explore the relationships between deterrence-based constructs and cybercrime, 
several studies have investigated whether different aspects of deterrence influence the 
progression of cyber-dependent crimes using experimental research designs (Maimon et al 2014, 
Wilson et al 2015, Testa et al 2017, Maimon et al 2019). These studies adopted Gibbs’ (1975) 
conceptualization of restrictive deterrence to guide their efforts in assessing the effectiveness of 
deterrence-based interventions in shaping the progression of system trespassing events. Maimon 
and colleagues (2014), for example, tested the effect of a warning banner in an attacked 
computer system on the progression, frequency, and duration of system trespassing events. 
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Deploying a large set of target computers built for the sole purpose of being attacked (i.e., 
honeypots) on the Internet infrastructure of a large USA university, these scholars revealed that 
although a warning banner did not lead to the immediate termination of trespassing incidents or 
reduce their frequency, it did result in a shorter average duration of the system trespassing 
incidents. Interestingly, the effect of a warning message on the duration of repeated trespassing 
incidents was attenuated in computers with a large bandwidth capacity. Stockman et al (2015) 
offered further support for these findings.  
Testa and colleagues (2017) explored the effect of a warning banner in mitigating 
hackers’ levels of activity (i.e., roaming the attacked system and manipulating file permissions) 
in an attacked computer system, while considering the level of administrative privileges imposed 
by the system trespasser on the attacked computer. Analyzing data collected by Maimon and 
colleagues (2014) in their second experiment, Testa and associates (2017) reported that the 
presence of a warning banner on an attacked computer system had no statistically significant 
effect on the probability of either navigation or file permission change commands being entered 
on the system. However, when testing the effect of the warning banner on computers attacked by 
system trespassers with non-administrative privileges, the authors reported that a warning banner 
substantially reduced the use of both navigation and change file permission commands, 
compared to the no-warning computers. More recently, Maimon et al (2019) analyzed data 
collected in a randomized trial which was deployed in China, reporting that intruders are less 
likely to use “clean tracks” commands in the presence of detection by a legitimate user of an 
attacked computing environment, in the absence of subsequent presentation of sanction threats. 
 In addition to investigating the effectiveness of sanction threats in deterring the 
progression of hacking incidents, several scholars have investigated the effect of surveillance and 
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detection signs in restricting the scope of hackers’ illegitimate behaviors while taking over a 
system. Wilson and associates (2015), for example, assessed the effect of a surveillance banner 
on the probability of commands being entered in the attacked computer system. They found that 
the presence of a surveillance banner in the attacked computer systems reduced the probability of 
commands being typed in the system during longer initial system trespassing incidents. Further, 
they reported that the probability of commands being typed during subsequent system 
trespassing incidents (on the same target computer) was conditioned by the presence of a 
surveillance banner and by whether commands had been entered during previous trespassing 
incidents. Using the same data, Maimon and colleagues (2019) investigated whether the level of 
ambiguity regarding the presence of surveillance in an attacked computer system influences 
system trespassers’ likelihood to clean their tracks during the progression of an event. Their 
findings indicate that the presence of unambiguous signs of surveillance (i.e. the presence of both 
a surveillance banner and program in the attacked system) increases the probability of clean 
tracks commands being entered on the system.  
Despite the growing use of honeypots for understanding system trespassers’ behaviours 
during the progression of criminal event among criminologists (Maimon et al 2014; Wilson et al 
2015) and computer scientists (Farinholt et al 2017; Rezaeirad et al 2018), these tools present 
some methodological challenges to scholars (Holt 2017). For starters, while these simulated 
environments are indistinguishable from standard legitimate devices for less sophisticated 
hackers, fingerprinting techniques can be used by hackers to distinguish between regular online 
environments and honeypots (Mohammadzadeh, Mansoori, and Welch, 2013). In addition, 
honeypots are able to measure explicit actions but are unable to measure the fundamental 
attitudes, beliefs, and capabilities of intruders who interact with the honeypot. Finally, honeypots 
 12 
are also unable to detect communications such as warnings and recommendations between 
hackers that may alter behaviour within a honeypot (Holt 2017). Still, the usefulness of 
honeypots in understanding system trespassers responses to various computer configurations 
during the progression a criminal event is unique, and these findings should guide the design of 
more secure computing environments. 
Law Literature  
Substantive criminal laws set behavioral standards for individuals in society, detail legal rules 
that forbid specific types of behaviors, and elaborate potential legal sanctions imposed for 
deviating from these laws. Since cybercrime has become a serious threat to individuals, 
organizations, and governments all around the world, many countries have realized the necessity 
of establishing an arsenal of well-defined cybercrime laws which can guide law enforcement 
agencies’ efforts to pursue online offenders (Brenner 2001), and thus have enacted laws that 
prohibit specific types of behaviors with computers and computer networks. For example, in the 
USA, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 2008 prohibits accessing a computer without 
authorization or using a computer to defraud and extort. Similarly, in the UK, the Computer 
Misuse Act 1990 makes it illegal to gain improper access to a computer or to commit theft and 
extortion using computers. China, on the other hand, has amended the relevant provision of its 
criminal code twice (Amendment VII to the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
2009) to prevent illegal online activities. Importantly, in addition to cybercrime-specific laws, 
many countries also rely on laws designed to prevent terrestrial crimes when targeting certain 
types of cybercriminals.  
The underlying premise behind the enactment and enforcement of official cybercrime 
laws draws on the assumption that rational humans will be deterred from engagement in 
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illegitimate online activities once threatened by harsh, immediate, and certain punishments for 
initiating these behaviors. However, although extensive research has explored the effectiveness 
of familiarity with laws and the administration of criminal justice procedures across different 
junctions of the criminal justice system, in deterring individuals’ onset of criminal career and 
recidivism (Paternoster 2010), we know little about the effectiveness of cybercrime laws in 
preventing cybercrime incidents. Still, recent evidence on the effectiveness of USA cybercrime 
laws in preventing online crimes is starting to emerge.  
Mayer (2015), for example analyzed data from hundreds of civil and criminal pleadings 
that were processed in the USA between the years 2005-2012, and proposed that the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)1 cannot deter cyber criminals. Accordingly, since the potential 
benefits from initiating a cybercrime incident during those years outpaced the potential 
punishment enforced in both criminal and civil cases, the deterrence benefits of this law are 
negligible. Similarly, in a series of papers, Kigerl (2009, 2016, 2015, 2018) explored the 
potential impacts of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing 
Act (CAN SPAM Act)2 of 2013 on different aspects of email spamming. Analyzing data 
collected using multiple “honey-net” email addresses posted online for spammers to find and 
send spam emails to, Kigerl reported mixed findings regarding the deterring effect of this act. 
For example, while the CAN SPAM act had no effect on the amount of spam sent to targets 
(Kigerl 2009, 2016), or on the probability that spammers would embed their physical address in 
the spam email, the enactment of this act is positively associated with adding a verbal description 
of the email in the email’s subject line.  
 
1 The CFAA aims to prevent unauthorized access to computers and password trafficking.  
2 CAN SPAM Act aims to regulate the way unsolicited commercial emails are sent to email users, and to regulate 
the content that the email messages deliver.  
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Integrating the honey-net data with data collected from news articles published on the 
topic of CAN SPAM act, Kigerl (2016) reported that the number of ongoing CAN SPAM trials 
reported in popular news outlets is associated with a reduction in the amount of spam email sent, 
particularly in the USA (Kigerl 2018). In contrast, the volume of news articles reporting 
spammers’ detention seem to be positively associated with the volume of spam (Kigerl 2016), as 
well as with violation of email header forgery laws (Kigerl 2015). Finally, Hui and colleagues 
(2017) investigated the potential deterring effect of the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime (COC)3 
legislation, in terms of reducing the volume of DDoS attacks against enforcing countries. 
Analyzing data on DDoS attacks reported in 106 countries during 177 days between 2004 and 
2008, these authors reported that enforcing the COC decreased DDOS attacks by at least 11.8%. 
Moreover, Hui and associates (2017) observed that enforcement of the COC resulted in an 
increase of the number of DDoS attacks against non-enforcing countries.  
Although key for generating an initial understanding regarding the effect of cybercrime 
laws in deterring online criminal activities, the problematic nature of the samples and data 
employed throughout the studies reported in this section should be considered carefully. First, 
scholars’ reliance on secondary data and unfamiliarity with the full extent of the methodology 
behind the original data collection may raise questions regarding the validity of some of the 
constructs composed by the scholars. Moreover, drawing on news websites and popular media to 
construct key independent measures may introduce some selection bias, since only some cases 
end up in the media. Finally, failure to control for internal processes that occur at the organized-
 
3 The Convention on Cybercrime is an international treaty on crimes committed over the internet which seeks to 
improve international cooperation between nations in cybercrime investigations and harmonize national cybercrime 
laws.  
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crime group level, and that may influence the volume of online crime (Krebs 2014), calls into 
question the findings reported in these papers.  
Information Systems Literature  
Consistent with the criminological literature which focuses on understanding different aspects of 
punishment in preventing online crime, empirical attention has been devoted within the 
Information Systems field to exploring different aspects of sanctions in preventing cyber-
dependent crimes. However, while criminologists focus on online offenders, Information System 
scholars mostly aim to understand computer misuse by employees in organizations, as well as 
employees’ compliance with organizational security policies (Cram et al 2017). In general, 
findings regarding the effectiveness of sanctions in reducing employees’ computer misuse and 
violation of information security policies are mixed (D’Arcy and Herath 2010). For example, 
although some research reports that punishment severity decreases intentions to violate 
information security policies, technology misuse, and computer abuse (D’Arcy et al 2009; 
Devarj 2012; Cheng et al 2013), other studies find this effect in the USA only (Hovav and Darcy 
2012) while still others do not observe this relationship at all (Hu et al 2011). Moreover, the 
effect of sanctions’ certainty in reducing intentions to misuse information security was 
significant for specific populations only (Darcy et al 2009; Hovav and Darcy 2012). Finally, 
several studies find an insignificant effect of sanction celerity on individuals’ violation of 
information security policies (Hu et al 2011). Still, Barlow and colleagues (2013) observed that 
clearly communicating sanctions is key for reducing intentions to violate information security 
policies among employees.  
Since several scholars believe that non-compliance and violations of security policies are 
behaviors distinct from compliance behaviors (Guo 2013), extensive research has also assessed 
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the role of deterrence in encouraging employees’ compliance with organizational cybersecurity 
policies. In fact, Sommestad and colleagues’ (2014) systematic review of the key variables that 
influence information security compliance behaviors suggested that deterrence-based sanctions 
are stronger predictors of policy compliance than non-compliance. Herath and Rao (2009a), for 
example, reported that sanction certainty increases employees’ intention to comply with 
information security policy. Operationalizing subjects’ assessments of detection probability as a 
proxy for sanction certainty, Li and associates (2010) further confirmed this finding. However, 
both studies failed to observe a significant relationship between perception of punishment 
severity and compliance with organizational security policies. Chen and associates (2012) 
reported that in addition to the effectiveness of punishment certainty, employees’ high certainty 
for rewards increased their intentions to comply with information security policy.  
In addition to exploring the effects of deterrence-based strategies on employees’ 
computer abuse and compliance/non-compliance with security policies, extensive IS research has 
investigated ways in which rewards and punishments could influence employees’ decisions to 
engage in self-protective behaviors (Herath and Rao 2009b, Johnston and Warkentin 2010, 
Siponen et al 2010). This line of research draws on Protection-Motivation Theory (PMT) 
(Rogers 1975, 1983), which suggests that individuals are more likely to protect themselves from 
potential risks after receiving fear-arousing recommendations. Specifically, two processes must 
occur for a person to engage in an adaptive protective response. First, in the threat-appraisal 
process, the threat and generated fear that inspire protection motivation must be weighted more 
heavily than the maladaptive rewards earned by not engaging in protection motivation. Second, 
in the coping-appraisal process, a person’s response efficacy and self-efficacy must outweigh the 
response costs for engaging in the protection motivation (Rogers 1975).  
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Consistent with samples used to investigate deterrence-based premises in the Information 
Systems field, most of the empirical research employing PMT draws on data collected from 
samples of organizational employees. Herath and Rao (2009b) reported that employees make 
inaccurate predictions about the probability of experiencing a security breach in their 
organizations, which in turn resulted in non-compliance with organizational security policies. In 
contrast, employees’ accurate assessments of their organizational vulnerability to information 
security threats was found to have a significant effect on their intentions to comply with security 
policies (Siponen et al 2010). Moreover, Workman and colleagues (2008) reported that 
employees’ subjective assessments of risk severity as a result of a breach of their confidential 
information, as well as their perceived vulnerability to cyber-dependent crime, were negatively 
associated with failure to apply security solutions. Finally, focusing on the relationships between 
fear appeals and the enactment of computer security behaviors, Johnson and Warkentin (2010) 
reported that while there is an overall positive effect of fear appeal on the use of computer 
security behaviors, this effect varies in magnitude across users and based on individuals’ 
personality traits (for example level of self-efficacy), cognitive processes (i.e. threat severity), 
and social influence (see also Boss et al 2015 and Siponen et al 2010). Still, no prior research has 
explored whether employees’ compliance with organizational security policies reduces the 
organization’s risk of cyber-dependent crime victimization.  
Similar to the issues embedded in survey-based criminological research of online 
offenders, the bulk of the Information Systems scholarship which focuses on deterrence suffers 
from various methodological issues. Specifically, the focus on employees’ intentions instead of 
actual illegitimate activities with their organizational networks (Li et al 2010), questionable 
operationalizations of key deterrence constructs (Siponen et al 2010), and the cross-sectional 
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nature of the data collected and reported in most of these studies raise questions regarding the 
observed empirical patterns. 
Political Science Literature  
In contrast to criminologists’, information systems scientists’, and law scholars’ interest in 
exploring how different aspects of deterrence determine individual involvement in online crime, 
political scientists’ discussions on cyber-deterrence are focused on countries’ efforts to prevent 
and dissuade rival nations’ attempts to launch cyber-attacks. Specifically, Libicki (2009) 
suggested that the goal of cyber-deterrence is to attenuate the risk of cyber-attacks to an 
acceptable level at an acceptable cost, when a defending state aims to mitigate potential 
offensive actions by threatening a potential retaliation. Several scholars identify the means 
thorough which nations’ deterring postures in cyberspace could be achieved. Iasiello (2014), for 
example, differentiated between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial (see also 
Nye (2016) and Lupovici (2011)). Specifically, while deterrence by punishment is focused on 
conveying to potential attackers that significant sanctions will be imposed in retaliation to any 
cyber-attack, deterrence by denial aims to convey to potential attackers that their aggressive 
efforts in cyberspace will be futile. Importantly, Iasiello (2014) argued that the key factors 
required for supporting both means of deterrence are (1) effective communication of the 
deterring messages, (2) the ability to properly signal intentions to receivers, (3) the ability to 
successfully attribute attacks to an aggressor, and (4) proportional retaliation for different cyber-
attacks. Nye (2017) identified two additional means of deterrence: entanglement and norms. 
Entanglement refers to the presence of interdependencies which make the consequence of an 
attack serious to both the attacker and the target. Similarly, normative considerations refer to the 
potential reputational costs that may follow a cyber-attack and which may damage an actor’s soft 
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power beyond the value gained from an attack. Finally, Tor (2017) discussed the relevance of 
cumulative deterrence against cyber-attacks. Drawing on the rationale advanced by Gibbs (1975) 
in his discussion of restrictive deterrence, cumulative deterrence refers to repeated attacks on a 
rival in response to specific behaviors, over a long period of time, and in some cases 
disproportionally to the attacker’s aggressive behaviors (Tor 2017).  
Given the considerable theoretical attention provided in the political science discipline to 
the different means of cyber-deterrence, one may expect a similar level of scientific exploration 
around the effectiveness of various deterrence approaches in preventing and mitigating nations’ 
aggression in cyberspace. However, a recent systematic review by Gorwa and Smeets (2019) 
suggested that such empirical works are still missing in this field. Indeed, only two studies 
(Kostyuk and Zhukov 2019; Valeriano and Maness 2014) examined the dynamic of cyber 
conflict between rival nations while employing quantitative research designs methods. 
Specifically, Valeriano and Maness (2014) analyzed data from 110 cyber incidents and 45 cyber 
disputes and found that when cyber operations and incidents occur, they tend to carry a minimal 
impact and low severity due to the dynamic of cyber restraint. In contrast, Kostyuk and Zhukov’s 
(2019) analyses of cyber-attack data collected during the conflicts in Ukraine (between 2013-
2016) and Syria (between 2011-2016) revealed that cyber-attacks do not facilitate an effective 
vehicle of coercion during war. Unfortunately, neither of these papers examine the theoretical 
aspects of cyber-deterrence and their effectiveness in preventing and dissuading cyber-attacks.   
Policy Implications and Directions for Future Research  
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) has evolved to become one of the 
central elements of U.S. national cyber security strategy (www.whitehouse.gov). One key 
activity in the CNCI highlights the development of deterrence-based strategies designed to 
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prevent and mitigate the consequences of cyber-attacks against U.S. organizations and 
individuals. However, despite the emphasis placed on cyber-deterrence, this review reveals 
mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of different aspects of deterrence-based strategies in 
preventing the occurrence of malicious cyber activities. Specifically, studies published in both 
criminological and information systems journals suggest that the effect of sanction severity in 
preventing online crime is inconsistent (Skinner and Fream 1997; Morris and Blackburn 2009; 
D’Arcy et al 2009; Hovav and D’Arcy 2012), and that the effect of punishment certainty is only 
significant among specific populations of online offenders (Morris and Blackburn 2009; Darcy et 
al 2009; Hovav and Darcy 2012). In contrast, the detection and attribution of online crime 
(Guitton 2012; Maimon et al 2019), along with clear communication of sanctions (Barlow et al 
2013), are consistently found to be negatively associated with online criminals’ willingness to 
launch cyberattacks and adopt avoidance strategies. Moreover, the effectiveness of various 
deterrence-based methods in restricting the scope and disrupting the progression of online 
criminal events has been reported in several criminological studies (Maimon et al 2014; Wilson 
et al 2015; Testa et al 2017).  
Finally, while previous information systems and law research tends to test the effect of 
general deterrence (although not explicitly) on online crime (Kigerl 2016; Mayer 2015; Hui et al 
2017), no prior research has tested the effect of punishment on online offenders’ recidivism. 
Therefore, in addition to ongoing policy efforts which aim to prevent online crime by adopting 
deterrence-based policies, practitioners and cybersecurity experts should consider adopting 
deterrence-based approaches for mitigating the consequence of online criminal events (Maimon 
and Louderback 2019; Willison, Lowry and Paternoster 2018). This approach should also guide 
cybersecurity experts’ efforts to develop new technical tools which may support the mitigation 
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and discovery of cybercrime incidents. Indeed, these experts have devoted considerable attention 
in the last twenty years to developing tools that are designed to detect computer and network 
vulnerabilities, and to prevent cybercrimes from developing (Waldrop 2016). Although such 
tools are designed to identify vulnerabilities and prevent their exploitation by malicious actors, 
none of them allow rapid detection of these incidents or effective mitigation of the consequences 
of an attack. Moreover, the effectiveness of these tools in preventing online crime is 
questionable. Therefore, configuring new tools while drawing on the restrictive deterrence 
approach may prove useful in reducing the scope of online offenders during the progression of 
cybercrime events (Gibbs 1975).  
Future research should further explore whether cyber-deterrence prevents and disrupts the 
progression of cyber-crimes. Such research should explore the influence of both absolute and 
restrictive cyber-deterrence. As elsewhere, one of the major hurdles in this area could be the 
absence of universally accepted measurement metrics, which would provide guardians and 
scholars with practical techniques for assessing the effectiveness of deterrence-based efforts, 
security policies, and tools in preventing cybercrime (Torres et al 2006). Indeed, the most 
common approach to the implementation of preventive practices in online environments draws 
on guardians’ personal experience in the field, as well as their personal world views when 
making security-related decisions that may influence offenders and targets (Siponen and 
Willison 2009). Such an approach does not require rigorous empirical evaluations of security 
tools and policies to support the decision-making by these professionals. In fact, Blakely (2002) 
suggested that this approach has failed to prevent individuals and organizations from becoming 
the targets and victims of cybercrime. Therefore, Blakely proposed the adoption of an approach 
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that monetizes guardianship efforts and quantifies the effectiveness of security tools and policies 
in achieving their stated goals.  
Scholars within each of the scientific disciplines reviewed in this paper should consider 
conducting empirical research that will push the envelope in the context of all four disciplines 
simultaneously. Criminologists and information systems scholars should seek to collect data on 
online crime directly from the field and create better operationalization of deterrence-based 
concepts. Given the cynicism developed in the criminological field about the collection and 
analysis of data, datasets that are used by cyber criminologists in their publications should be 
made publicly available. Future criminological research should further explore how different 
configurations of online environments shape both online offenders’ and targets’ involvement in 
cyber-dependent crimes (Lessig 2009). Encouraged by findings reported in the criminological 
literature indicating that environmental design could reduce the volume of robbery (Jeffrey et al 
1987), vandalism (Sloan-Howitt and Kelling 1990), and shoplifting (Farrington and Burrows 
1993) incidents, guardians’ familiarity with computer and online configurations that result in 
lower rates of and less damage from cyber-dependent crimes could guide the design of safer 
online environments.  
Law scholars should attempt to produce empirical assessments regarding the 
effectiveness of computer crime laws in deterring crime, both in the USA and in other places 
around the globe. Particular attention should be given to investigating the effectiveness of 
official punishment in reducing recidivism among convicted online criminals. Similarly, political 
scientists should also seek to produce more empirical research around the effectiveness of 
cyberwarfare in preventing and mitigating nations’ aggression in cyberspace (Gorwa and Smeets 
2019). Furthermore, future law research should continue to assess the effect of international 
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collaborations on cybercrime laws and their enforcement in reducing different types of online 
crime around the world.  
Finally, future research should seek to evaluate the most effective ways to successfully 
implement deterrence-based policies and law enforcement operations in online environments, as 
well as to assess the effectiveness of these approaches in preventing and mitigating the 
consequences of cybercrime. Such evaluations should include the development of cybercrime 
metrics that are clear, objective, repeatable, and simple (Atzeni and Lioy 2006).  
Conclusions  
Governmental agencies and private corporations around the globe employ a wide range of cyber 
laws, technical tools, and security policies in efforts to reduce their probability of becoming 
victims of cybercrime. Many of the laws, security tools, and organizational procedures utilize 
deterrence-based strategies, which aim to prevent the occurrence of offline crimes by threatening 
potential offenders with sanctions. Unfortunately, despite the prevalence of cyber-deterrence 
policies and strategies, the effectiveness of deterrence-based strategies in preventing and 
mitigating the occurrence of online crime is still relatively unknown within the criminological, 
law, information systems, and political science fields. Therefore, interested scholars within these 
academic disciplines should seek to produce rigorous evidence regarding deterrence-based 
policies, sanctions, and threats in preventing and mitigating cybercrime events. Specifically, 
while the available evidence regarding the effectiveness of cyber-deterrence in preventing 
cybercrime tends to draw mainly on survey-based research, efforts should be made to conduct 
scientific research that investigates the effectiveness of swift, severe, and certain sanctions for 
online crime in the wild, through the implementation of experimental research designs. This 
should be done while paying close attention to the immense disconnect that exists between the 
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various academic disciplines around the topic of cyber-deterrence. Active efforts should seek to 
bridge this disconnect, in order to allow a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of 
different aspects of deterrence in cyberspace.   
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